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Spotlight on the CIA

ON OCTOBER 16, 1959, U.S. Embassy attaché in Moscow Russell Langelle had a secret rendezvous with an American agent in the Soviet Union. He gave the agent a briefing, also certain items of cryptographic equipment and a large sum of money. At this point the two of them were detained by the Soviet security authorities. Langelle was promptly expelled from the Soviet Union.

On January 3, 1966, the Supreme Court of the United Arab Republic finished hearing the case of former editor-in-chief of the Cairo *Al Akhbar* Mustafa Amin, tried as an American spy. Amin maintained contact with U.S. Embassy attaché Bruce Taylor Odell. Shortly after Amin's arrest Odell was declared persona non grata and expelled from the U.A.R.

So far we know about Langelle and Odell that they were American intelligence men who covered up with diplomatic posts and who were then caught out. But anyone who might wish to learn more about their records can do so now without going to any great trouble. He has only to turn to the appropriate page in a reference book compiled by the well-known German journalist Julius Mader and recently published in the G.D.R.: "Who's Who in the CIA. A Biographical Dictionary of 3,000 Members of U.S. Civilian and Military Secret Services in 120 Countries." The item on Langelle runs: "Langelle, Russell A., b. 7. 10. 1922; 1942-55, Lt. Comdr., Office of Naval Intelligence; since 1956 with State Department, CIA activity; 1960, security officer at State Department. Overseas posts: Vienna, Moscow" (p. 296). And here is the

item on Odell: "Odell, Bruce Taylor, b. 30. 10. 1928; 1951-54, Lt., G2 U.S. Army; 1954-56, Pentagon MS.; since 1957 with State Department, CIA activity. Overseas posts: Teheran, Cairo" (p. 387).

The book covers 3,000 members of the American secret services, and this is of course only a fraction of the total. That total is certainly very large. U.S. intelligence activities extend today into literally every sphere of life. Then, too, besides the actual spies and information-gatherers and cloak-and-dagger men, there are the men who evaluate and study and co-ordinate, and who adapt scientific and technical developments to secret service ends. You may encounter among the members of U.S. intelligence outfits the polished diplomat and the gunman, the well-known politician and the petty agent-provocateur, prominent physicists and mathematicians and rocketry experts, call girls and professors of Slavic studies, dope peddlers and cracksmen and prima ballerinas.

So the six-digit figures that have appeared in the Western press are not particularly surprising. While certainly not accurate, possibly exaggerated, overall they are not so far from the truth. New York's well informed *Newsweek* has reported the intelligence branches to have about 100,000 people on their payroll. David Wise and Thomas Ross, who have made special studies of these agencies, put the figure at 200,000.

Julius Mader and his international team—he was assisted by journalists Mohamed Abdelnabi of Beirut, Ambalal Bhatt of Bombay, Fernando Gamarra of Mexico City and Shozo Ohashi of Yokohama—evidently mean to assemble information about some more of

these thousands. Mader writes in the preface to the book that other such publications will follow (p. 14).

So far, however, this one is unique. It is the first time the public have ever had access to a list of American secret servicemen.

The book's value would be hard to overrate. It not only unmasks individual American spies and saboteurs, but serves as a poignant reminder that "never before in the history of the United States has the influence of the secret services on domestic and foreign policy, also on military strategy and tactics, been so great" (p. 7).

After World War II U.S. intelligence rapidly grew into a total, global system. Its chiefs adopted one of the key principles of the intelligence services of militarist Japan and nazi Germany—the principle of a mass spy network. They embraced the fascist doctrine of total espionage, which one of the leaders of the nazi party, Rudolf Hess, had summed up in these words: "Everybody can be a spy. Everybody should be. There is no secret that cannot be penetrated." In its American version that doctrine means that all public and private bodies involved in any activities abroad must go in for espionage; that any U.S. citizen required to act as a spy must do so; and, lastly, that the spy network covers all aspects of the "enemy's" political, public, economic and cultural life.

How is it that the U.S. was able to create in a short space of time such a dense world-wide intelligence network? The reason was not only that Washington invested in intelligence some of its

best administrative and technical talent, also a lot of money (annual intelligence spending these days is estimated at about \$4,000 million, as against the total of \$135 million spent by the Office of Strategic Services over all the war years). Another important factor was that the Americans took over the ablest agents and massive spy networks of nazi Germany and militarist Japan.

One has only to recall the espionage organization under one of the nazi military intelligence chiefs, General Reinhard Gehlen, which the Americans set up in the Western zones of Germany in 1946 for operations against the Soviet Union and its Central and East European allies.

Why did they decide to create this secret service of several thousand former nazi spies? Here is the answer, supplied by the *New Republic*: "Instead of sending American agents into the territory held by the not-so-friendly ally [i. e., the Soviet zone], the CIC decided to make the fullest possible use of the spy network which General Gehlen had built up in the East. Moreover, it was assumed that Germans would better be able to report on conditions in Eastern Germany, and that it would be easier to handle them through fellow-countrymen, that is, Gehlen and his staff, than through foreign agents."

Apart from the Gehlen organization, too, many former nazi agents were used. Here are one or two examples. General Zahedi, whom the CIA got to stage its coup in Iran in 1953, had been an agent of the nazi security service. Police Commissar Dides, arrested by French counter-intelligence as an American agent in 1956, had collaborated with nazi espionage during the war.

In Japan, the Tokyo *Nippon Times* admitted that the biggest spies of the Japanese Special Service Organization were used as advisers after the war by the U.S. Army command in the Far East. It was also reported in the Japanese press that the CIA "generally recruits its Japanese agents among graduates of the former Nakano intelligence school or ex-members of Japanese army intelligence."

Many American authors, even serious students of the subject like Wise

and Ross, represent the CIA as a kind of state within the state, an "invisible government" operating independently of the White House and not infrequently pursuing policies of its own.

But that is not and could not be so. All the U.S. secret services take their orders from the President, and their activities are controlled and directed by the National Security Council, of which the President is also the head. Mader offers a very pertinent reminder of this. "The President of the United States," he writes, "personally exerts a decisive influence on all secret service affairs" (p. 7).

True, in order to disguise its interference in other nations' affairs it sometimes suits the White House to put the blame on intelligence. And that is generally the origin of those pieces in the press about the secret service having got out of hand and doing things on its own hook.

Mader's book offers quite a good insight into the American secret services' greatly increased "active" as distinct from merely spying operations, such as engineering plots and coups, getting "unsuitable" individuals "out of the way," putting out fabrications and false and panic rumours, stirring populations up against their governments.

The overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran (1953); the counter-revolutionary riots in Berlin and other cities of the G.D.R. (1953); the overthrow of the liberal Arbenz regime in Guatemala (1954); the counter-revolutionary putsch in Hungary (1956); the attempt on the life of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia (1959); the coup in the Congo (Kinshasa) and murder of Patrice Lumumba (1960); the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba (1961); the coup in Brazil (1964); the military intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965); the fascist coup in Greece (1967)—those are only some of the many such operations.

As may be seen, these activities are directed not only against the socialist countries but against Third World nations too. And a secret report by CIA man William Matthias which found its way into the press said as much. The CIA considered it very important. Matthias indicated, to counter national-libe-

ration movements and efforts by new nations to take the socialist way. Most underdeveloped countries were in such a mess, he said, that many situations were likely to arise which the great powers would find it hard to keep out of. And there would consequently be an increase in secret activity to influence developments in the right direction.

One can confidently say that "active" operations today get the bulk of the U.S. secret services' money and effort.

But it was not always so. In the early postwar years the emphasis was principally on the getting and processing of intelligence. Even after the establishment of the CIA in 1947, Christopher Felix points out in his book "The Spy and His Master," efforts centred chiefly on intelligence. That was what the Administration chiefly wanted then. This was the approach that went with the "containment" doctrine, which assigned the secret service to the auxiliary role of collecting the fullest possible information on Soviet defence capacity and creating a pretext for unleashing the atom bomb against the socialist states.

But before very long the whole situation was different. There was now a world system of socialism. The United States had lost its monopoly of the atom bomb. The break-up of the colonial system had brought forth new independent states which favoured peaceful co-existence. In these conditions America's rulers exchanged "containment" for the "liberation" doctrine, which set out to "roll back" communism, "liberate" the people of the socialist countries and restore the rule of the exploiters.

Under the new policy the secret service was assigned a much bigger role. There were actually cases when it was treated as an instrument with which counter-revolutionary conspiracies and revolts could be engineered in the socialist countries and popular rule thus liquidated in them without a "major war."

From the beginning of the fifties on, the number and size of "active" intelligence operations increased considerably. Wise and Ross point out. And the process continued under Eisenhower and under Kennedy and under Johnson.

Presidents come and go, so do CIA and other secret service chiefs, but the policy of extending "active" intelligence operations remains unchanged. Today it is an important part of the "bridge building" meant to undermine the socialist countries from within, and an element in the Pentagon's new strategic doctrine of "flexible response."

* * *

At the end of Julius Mader's book there is a blank page that can be torn

out and mailed as a postcard. The reader is asked to name on it any U.S. secret service men he knows of who do not figure in this first edition of the book. The information will be used to amplify subsequent editions.

Well, I too have my small contribution to make to Dr. Mader's important and valuable work of exposing American spies. Here are the names of four:

1. Todd, Albert, head of the Slavic Department of Indiana University and a CIA man.

2. Lt.-Col. Matson, one-time assistant U.S. military attaché in Moscow, expelled from the Soviet Union for espionage.

3. Lt.-Col. Jacobson, one-time assistant U.S. military attaché in Moscow, expelled from the Soviet Union for espionage.

4. Lodeesen, James, one-time second secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and a member of the CIA. Previously active in Brazil. Expelled from the Soviet Union for espionage.

26/6-10/7 A CPSU delegation led by Andrei Kirilenko, Central Committee Political Bureau Member and CC Secretary, visits Italy at the invitation of the Italian Communist Party to familiarize itself with its activities.

July

2-11 Soviet-Finnish negotiations in Helsinki on trade and other economic issues.

4-10 Gamal Abdel Nasser, U.A.R. President and Chairman of the Arab Socialist Union, pays an official visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and the Soviet government.

5 A Soviet-Moroccan trade agreement for 1969-73, envisaging a more than 100 per cent increase in the exchange of goods, is signed in Rabat.

6 The Ciudad Juarez (Mexico) police announce that 17-year-old Crispin Curiel Gonzalez, detained on suspicion of complicity in the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy, has been found dead in a local psychiatric hospital.

6-10 A conference of lawyers from 37 countries including the Soviet Union, held in Grenoble (France), discusses international law problems arising from U.S. aggression in Vietnam and condemns the war waged by the U.S. government against the Vietnamese people as "illegal and immoral."

WORLD EVENTS

7-14 Annual Baltic Peace Week in Rostock (G.D.R.).

8 An Athens military tribunal concludes hearings in the case of 21 members of the clandestine Defence of Democracy organization and sentences its leaders to long prison terms.

8-12 Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil pays an official visit to the U.S.S.R. at the invitation of the Soviet government.

9 The United States again violates the armistice agreement in Korea by opening fire on Korean People's Army units in the Manuri area in the western sector of the demarcation line.

♦ ♦ President Lyndon B. Johnson signs a bill increasing budget expenditure in the current financial year by \$9,000 million, of which \$6,000 million are earmarked for the war in Vietnam.

10 President Charles de Gaulle appoints Maurice Couve de Murville Premier in succession to Georges Pompidou who has resigned.

♦ ♦ The Boston Federal Court sentences four anti-war crusaders—Benjamin Spock, William Coffin, Mitchell Goodman and Michael Ferber—to two years in prison.

♦ ♦ Major-General Chalad Hirsansiri, commander of the Thai Panther Division, announces that 5,000 of his men will be moved to South Vietnam beginning July 19, and that the rest will follow.

11 A Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1968, issued in London, reveals that in spite of the government's promise to cut military expenditure it is rising and will reach £2,254 million in the current financial year.

11-13 Premier Alexei Kosygin pays an official visit to Sweden at the invitation of her government. A Soviet-Swedish communiqué is issued on the termination of the visit.

♦ ♦ The Soviet press publishes Soviet documents on the exchange of views with the German Federal Republic on renunciation of the use of armed force.

14-15 Bulgarian, G.D.R., Hungarian, Polish and Soviet Party and government leaders meet in Warsaw to discuss the international situation, European peace and security, and the world communist and working-class movement. They also exchange information about the situation in their countries and the developments in Czechoslovakia, and send a joint letter to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

15 Inauguration of the new Moscow-New York airline, to be serviced by Aeroflot and Pan American planes.

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